Recurrence Again

Philosophical Studies 172 (2):445-457 (2015)
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Abstract

Kit Fine has replied to my criticism of a technical objection he had given to the version of Millianism that I advocate. Fine evidently objects to my use of classical existential instantiation in an object-theoretic rendering of his meta-proof. Fine’s reply appears to involve both an egregious misreading of my criticism and a significant logical error. I argue that my rendering is unimpeachable, that the issue over my use of classical EI is a red herring, and that Fine’s original argument commits the straw-man fallacy. I argue further that contrary to Fine’s gratuitous attribution, what Kripke’s Pierre lacks and a typical bilingual has is not knowledge of a “manifest-making” premise, but the capacity to recognize London when it is differently designated. Fine’s argument refutes a preposterous theory no one advocates while leaving standard Millianism unscathed. The failure of his argument threatens to render Fine’s central notion of “coordination” redundant or empty.

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Nathan Salmón
University of California at Santa Barbara

References found in this work

A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
Semantic relationism.Kit Fine (ed.) - 2007 - Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Reasoning with arbitrary objects.Kit Fine - 1985 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
References.Kit Fine - 2007 - In Semantic Relationism. Ames, Iowa, USA: Blackwell. pp. 141–142.
Recurrence.Nathan Salmon - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):407-441.

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