This paper considers Gianni Vattimo’s rejection of metaphysical conceptions of being in favor of a hermeneutic ontology developed along the lines of ‘weak thought.’ I argue that Vattimo’s critique neglects an abiding pluralism within the very history of metaphysical thought itself; at least some metaphysical conceptions of being in that history do not fall prey to his critique. To establish my claim I turn to Thomas Aquinas, whose metaphysics is couched within a larger theological context and presents itself dynamically, thereby expressing some of the very features that Vattimo himself accords to Being.
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-022-09829-y
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Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 170 (4):463-464.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Philosophy 56 (217):427-429.
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.M. Heidegger - 1982 - In Trans Albert Hofstadter (ed.).
A Farewell to Truth.Gianni Vattimo & Robert T. Valgenti - 2011 - Columbia University Press.

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