Abstract

I argue that there are three aspects to the problem of explaining Descartes' experimental practice. First I show that Descartes is always more concerned with collecting a large quantity of data than with making any observation accurately. This is at first to be explained in terms of his belief in the need to develop a universal science. Second I show that Descartes rejects certain data as irrelevant for assessing his theories. These actions he justifies by blaming the false predictions on certain auxiliary hypotheses, and I show that he has well developed views concerning both when one is justified in keeping scientific theories in the face of recalcitrant data and also when one can not blame the auxiliary hypotheses but must reject the theory. Finally I show that on numerous occasions he simply refuses to believe some experimental results adduced by others. This is to be explained in terms of a belief of his that a scientist's description of phenomena will be determined partially by the theories he holds. Though this last aspect of Descartes' experimental practice is reasonable if taken in isolation, there are problems with it if Descartes is to keep his theory of the role of auxiliary hypotheses. ;In this dissertation I examine Descartes' views on testing theories with evidence. Prima facie he appears to be inconsistent in both his experimental practice and in his methodological claims concerning the use of empirical data. On the one hand he seems to be avidly interested in obtaining certain experimental results and in using them to test theories, and there are philosophical texts which appear to justify such an interest. But on the other hand Descartes often rejects many experimental reports, and there are likewise texts which appear to justify these actions. If one is not to infer that Descartes' methodology is inconsistent or his practice capricious, then one must find some way of reconciling these actions