Metaphilosophy 45 (3):422-440 (2014)

Alex Sager
Portland State University
Philip Kitcher presents an ambitious account of pragmatic naturalism that incorporates an explanatory story of the emergence and development of ethics, a metaethical perspective on progress, and a normative stance for moral theorizing. This article contends that Kitcher's normative stance is incompatible with the explanatory and metaethical components of his project. Instead, pragmatic naturalists should endorse a normative ethics that is experimental, grounded in practice, and acutely aware of cognitive and informational limitations. In particular, the ethical project would benefit from endorsing empirical work on participatory democracy for the identification of mechanisms to guide us on deep moral conflicts
Keywords Philip Kitcher  ethical project  participatory democracy  moral naturalism  pragmatism  reconstruction in philosophy  John Dewey  applied philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/meta.12093
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,307
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Practical Philosophy.Immanuel Kant - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Ethical Project.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Harvard University Press.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1996 - In Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37-108.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
47 ( #241,167 of 2,507,867 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,715 of 2,507,867 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes