Abstract

This essay is going to show that the relationship between sublimity and morality in Kant’s precritical thinking doesn’t have a systematic philosophical form. The reason can be sought out in these two things: first, aesthetic feeling and moral feeling haven’t been distinguished clearly and have been defined in terms of each other. Second, morality is grounded in feeling, not pure practical reason and its a priori principle. In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant invites human beings to ground moral principles on general affection. Although these principles are universal, they are not speculative rules and every human being should find them in his bosom. These are the feeling of beauty and dignity of human nature. In Remarks in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant’s thinking about morality changes in the way that can be regarded as the basis of his thought in critical period. However, he still believes that moral feeling is a kind of feeling of pleasure and displeasure to which we are not passive, but we are active because of possessing moral freedom.