The Single-Minded Animal: Shared Intentionality, Normativity, and the Foundations of Discursive Cognition [Book Review]

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (4):446-452 (2022)
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Abstract

Stovall’s overall project in The Single-Minded Animal is to develop a new theory of discursive normativity: our ability to judge what we ought to think and what we ought to do according to rules. His account draws on primate psychology, cognitive science, and recent work in possible world semantics to flesh out an account of what it is to engage in rational choice.

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10.1080/09672559.2022.2148232

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Carl Sachs
Marymount University

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The weirdest people in the world?Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine & Ara Norenzayan - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):61-83.
In defense of picturing; Sellars’s philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience.Carl B. Sachs - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (4):669-689.
Picturing, signifying, and attending.Bryce Huebner - 2018 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1 (31):7-40.

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