Abstract

There are two main ideas that inform the current reflection in the philosophy of mind, namely that the content of mental states is constitutively dependent on worldly, environmental facts and that phenomenology depends only on the intrinsic features of a subject. The question I shall address is whether it is possible to preserve both ideas within a strong intentionalist account. In other words, as the title goes: Can phenomenology be narrow if content is wide and phenomenology is claimed to depend on intentionality? The paper has the following structure: I shall start by presenting a triad which seems to rule out the possibility of preserving both content externalism and phenomenological internalism. Then, after having claimed that the only way in which a strong intentionalist could stick to those two ideas is to make the phenomenal character of a mental state independent for its individuation on the mental state’s content, I shall present what I take to be the only possible variety of which is compatible with such a move.