A reelaboração do transcendental em Merleau-Ponty

Doispontos 9 (1) (2012)
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In this paper, I argue that Merleau-Ponty reformulates traditional transcendental philosophy in the sense of showing that the a priori conditions of experience cannot be separated from the concrete experiences of the embodiedsubject. In the first section, I revisit Kant and Husserl, to analyze how these authors delimit the transcendental conditions as a formal domain independent from any concrete experience. Then I reconstruct the argumentative move through which Merleau-Ponty rejects this formal delimitation of the transcendental sphere and reintroduces it as inseparable from empirical domain, initially in The Structure of Behavior (section 2) and later in Phenomenology of Perception (section 3)



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Marcus Sacrini
University of São Paulo

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References found in this work

Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
La Structure du comportement.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1967 - Paris,: Presses universitaires de France.
Merleau-Ponty's ontology.Martin C. Dillon - 1997 - Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
Merleau-Ponty's Ontology.Steven Laycock - 19992 - Noûs 26 (3):365-368.

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