R. G. Collingwood on the identity of thoughts

Dialogue 28 (1):77-89 (1989)
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Abstract

R. G. Collingwood's re-enactment doctrine has been widely discussed in recent years by his commentators. However, most philosophers who discuss the re-enactment doctrine touch only briefly on his view of the identity of thoughts. This is surprising because Collingwood claims that the historian's successful re-enactment of the thought behind the historical agent's action involves re-thinking the same thought as the agent and not merely a copy of his thought.

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Citations of this work

Robin George Collingwood.Giuseppina D'Oro & James Connelly - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Re-enactment and radical interpretation.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2004 - History and Theory 43 (2):198–208.
Beyond Narrativism: The historical past and why it can be known.J. Ahlskog & G. D'Oro - 2021 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 27 (1):5-33.

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References found in this work

Thought and knowledge: essays.Norman Malcolm - 1977 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
An Autobiography.R. G. Collingwood - 1940 - Philosophy 15 (57):89-91.
Scepticism and Historical Knowledge.Alan Donagan - 1967 - Philosophical Quarterly 17 (66):85-86.

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