Testimony, credit, and blame

Abstract

This paper examines ordinary people’s responses to Jennifer Lackey’s Chicago Visitor case. In particular it examines responses regarding the case from participants with Taiwanese backgrounds and US backgrounds. The Chicago Visitor case is one of the most influential cases in epistemology in recent years and plays a significant role in a number of debates in epistemology. First, the case is used to suggest that the Credit View is mistaken. Second, the case seems to pose a problem for a virtue epistemological account of the nature of knowledge. Our paper explores these points in relation to our survey results, which show that participants believe that the protagonist in the case does have knowledge and that the protagonist deserves some credit for his true belief. Our aim in this paper, however, isn’t only to discover evidence bearing on the discussion of the Chicago Visitor case and cross cultural differences related to that case, we are also interested in what else the case might tell us about epistemic agency. For this reason we also asked participants to tell us to what extent they thought that the protagonist would be at fault in a case in which their belief turned out to be false. Here most of the participants found that the protagonist would indeed bear some fault in such circumstances. Our survey results also show, however, that participants of US background tend to be likely to attribute less fault to the testimonial recipient in bad testimonial cases, than their Taiwanese counterparts. More generally, we explore what the result regarding fault can tell us about epistemic agency.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Two problems of easy credit.Wayne Riggs - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):201-216.
Knowledge and credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?Peter J. Graham - 2006 - Philosophica 78 (2):105-127.
There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.Cameron Boult - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):518-534.
The Concept of Testimony.Nicola Mößner - 2011 - In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement, Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 207-209.
Learning from Words.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):572-574.
The emotion account of blame.Leonhard Menges - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):257-273.
Standing to epistemically blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11355-11375.
Virtue Epistemology and Testimonial Knowledge.Sun Hyung Rhee - 2016 - Philosophical Analysis 36:29-51.
Reid on the credit of human testimony.James Van Cleve - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 50-75.
Responsibility for Testimonial Belief.Benjamin McMyler - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
On the Nature of Testimony.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):114-127.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-01-19

Downloads
14 (#934,671)

6 months
6 (#431,022)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Masaharu Mizumoto
Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
Shane Ryan
City University of Hong Kong

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references