A HUMEAN ACCOUNT OF TESTIMONIAL JUSTIFICATION

Logos and Episteme 5 (2):209-219 (2014)
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Abstract

I argue that a Humean account can make sense of the phenomenology associated with testimonial justification; the phenomenology being that in standard cases hearers regularly simply accept a testifier’s assertions as true – hearers don't engage in monitoring. The upshot is that a Humean account is in a better position dialectically than is usually supposed. I provide some background to the debate before setting out two challenges facing accounts of testimonial justification. The first challenge is to provide an account that accords with the phenomenology of testimonial reception; the second challenge is to provide an account that can make sense of some testimonial beliefs enjoying greater justification than others. I show the credulist position to be vulnerable to the second challenge and the Humean position to be vulnerable to the first challenge. I argue that a Humean account, by drawing on dual process theory, can overcome the first challenge.

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Shane Ryan
City University of Hong Kong

Citations of this work

Virtuous testimonial belief in young children.Shane Ryan - 2019 - South African Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):263-272.

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