Rules are Laws: an Argument against Holism

Philosophical Explorations 1 (3):215-232 (1998)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue against the holistic claim that the description and explanation of human behaviour is irreducibly social in nature. I focus on the more specific thesis that human behaviour is rule-guided and that 'rule' is an irreducibly social notion. Against this claim I defend a teleofunctional and reductionist view. Following Millikan (1990), who argues that 'rule' can be explicated in functional terms, I extend her argument to cover social rules as well, and argue that rules are laws. I conclude that human rule-guided behaviour can be described and explained in functional, and in the end causal, i.e. causal-historical, terms.

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