Symposium papers, comments and an abstract: Merleau-ponty and the myth of bodily intentionality

Noûs 22 (1):35-47 (1988)
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Abstract

I argue that, while merleau-ponty succeeds in justifying the claim that certain human intentional states essentially involve an embodied subject, one cannot justifiably assert the further claim that this sort of bodily intentionality involves a radically different account of what makes the state intentional. contrary to some currently popular interpretations, i argue that merleau-ponty's account of bodily intentionality requires the use of concepts and representations.

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2009-01-28

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Harré and Merleau-ponty: Beyond the absent moving body in embodied social theory.Charles R. Varela - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (2):167–185.

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