Noûs 22 (1):35-47 (1988)

I argue that, while merleau-ponty succeeds in justifying the claim that certain human intentional states essentially involve an embodied subject, one cannot justifiably assert the further claim that this sort of bodily intentionality involves a radically different account of what makes the state intentional. contrary to some currently popular interpretations, i argue that merleau-ponty's account of bodily intentionality requires the use of concepts and representations.
Keywords Metaphysics intention body representation
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DOI 10.2307/2215547
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Harré and Merleau-Ponty: Beyond the Absent Moving Body in Embodied Social Theory.Charles R. Varela - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (2):167–185.

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