Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):659 – 677 (2007)

Authors
Luke Russell
University of Sydney
Abstract
Adam Morton, Stephen de Wijze, Hillel Steiner, and Eve Garrard have defended the view that evil action is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. By this, they do not that mean that evil actions feel different to ordinary wrongs, but that they have motives or effects that are not possessed to any degree by ordinary wrongs. Despite their professed intentions, Morton and de Wijze both offer accounts of evil action that fail to identify a clear qualitative difference between evil and ordinary wrongdoing. In contrast, both Steiner's and Garrard's accounts of evil do point to qualitative distinctions between kinds of action, but it is implausible that either account correctly characterizes evil. The most plausible accounts maintain that evil actions have a necessary connection to extreme harms, and this suggests that evil is not qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400701728566
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References found in this work BETA

Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John Mcdowell & I. G. Mcfetridge - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 52:13-42.
Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.
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Citations of this work BETA

Is Evil Just Very Wrong?Todd Calder - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):177-196.
A Conception of Evil.Paul Formosa - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (2):217-239.
Dispositional Accounts of Evil Personhood.Luke Russell - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):231 - 250.
Evil and Its Opposite.Todd Calder - 2015 - Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2):113-130.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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