From Fly Detectors to Action Control: Representations in Reinforcement Learning

Philosophy of Science 88 (5):1045-1054 (2021)
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Abstract

According to radical enactivists, cognitive sciences should abandon the representational framework. Perceptuomotor cognition and action control are often provided as paradigmatic examples of nonrepresentational cognitive phenomena. In this article, we illustrate how motor and action control are studied in research that uses reinforcement learning algorithms. Crucially, this approach can be given a representational interpretation. Hence, reinforcement learning provides a way to explicate action-oriented views of cognitive systems in a representational way.

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Author Profiles

Anna-Mari Rusanen
University of Helsinki
Jesse Kuokkanen
University of Helsinki

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How to think about mental content.Frances Egan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):115-135.
Animal intelligence.Edward L. Thorndike - 1899 - Psych Revmonog 8 (2):207-208.
Overly Enactive Imagination? Radically Re‐Imagining Imagining.Daniel D. Hutto - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (S1):68-89.

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