Causation, compulsion, and compatibilism

American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (4):313-321 (1988)
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Abstract

The empiricist-compatibilist strategy falls, essentially, into two distinct stages of argument. Historically speaking, the first stage was initiated by Hobbes and the second stage was initiated by Hume. The first stage, which I shall refer to as the "compulsion argument" seeks to describe the general significance of the distinction between causation and compulsion for the "free will" dispute. The second stage of the empiricist-compatibilist strategy, which I shall refer to as the "regularity argument," endeavours to reconstruct the compulsion argument on the foundation of the regularity theory of causation. My primary concern in this paper will be to examine the relation between these two stages of the empiricist-compatibilist strategy. Proponents of this strategy claim that the regularity argument strengthens the compatibilist position. I will argue, on the contrary, that the regularity argument generates serious difficulties for the compulsion argument and that it therefore weakens the compatibilist position. In this way I will be concerned to show that the traditional empiricist-compatibilist strategy suffers from significant internaltensions and that these tensions indicate that the regularity theory of causation does not serve as a particularly secure or congenial metaphysical foundation upon which to rest the compatibilist position as it is generally understood.

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Paul Russell
Lund University

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