Abstract
Kant’s objection to the ontological argument in the first Critique is
thought to be contained within the claim that ‘existence is not a predicate’.
This article maintains that this ‘digression’ on existence is not Kant’s main objection.
Instead, Kant argues within the first eight paragraphs of this fourteen
paragraph section that there is no meaningful predication – either logical or
real – without a synthetic, existential judgment concerning the subject of predication.
Thus, the very subject of predication of the proof (God) is an empty concept
and an indeterminate nominal definition (rather than a real possibility) that
allows for neither meaningful predication nor the generation of a contradiction. I
argue that this objection is significantly different than classical objections that
are often identified with it and from Kant’s objection in 1763. I also argue that
Kant’s target is not simply the Cartesian argument but is also his own pre-critical
onto-theological argument. There is little evidence that Kant continues to accept
the a priori onto-theological argument, and, in fact, he rejects its core claims in
his discussion of the ontological argument and in the final paragraphs of the
section on the Ideal of Reason.