The Primacy of Concepts and the Priority of Judgments in Frege's Logic

Grazer Philosophische Studien 56 (1):73-90 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper presents a historical account of the primacy of concepts in Frege's conception of logic. Moreover, it argues that Frege's priority-thesis (i.e., the assumption that judgeable contents are prior to concepts) does not imply that sentential logic is more basic than the logic of concepts in his thought.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Frege, Kant, and the logic in logicism.John MacFarlane - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):25-65.
Broadened logic.Avrum Stroll - 2003 - Topoi 22 (1):93-104.
Frege on Indirect Proof.Ivan Welty - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):283-290.
Was Wittgenstein Frege's heir?Karen Green - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):289-308.
Gödel on Concepts.Gabriella Crocco - 2006 - History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (2):171-191.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-04-04

Downloads
71 (#226,531)

6 months
10 (#251,846)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Marco Ruffino
University of Campinas

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references