Metaphysical Presuppositions of Scientific Practice

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):1-20 (1998)
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Abstract

A certain order or stability of nature has often been seen as a necessary presupposition of many of our scientific practices, in particular of our use of information gained in one kind of circumstance to explain or predict what happens in quite different situations. John Maynard Keynes and, more recently, Nancy Cartwright have argued that these practices commit us to the existence of stable ‘atoms’ or ‘natures’ or ‘tendencies.’ The phenomena we observe in nature are, on this view, the result of superimposing the invariable, context-independent effects of all the different tendencies involved.

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XII*—Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws.Nancy Cartwright - 19934 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1):279-292.
Cartwright and the Lying Laws of Physics.Ronald Laymon - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (7):353.
Fragility and deterministic modelling in the exact sciences.R. K. Tavakol - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):147-156.

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