Does Socrates Consistently Hold the Sufficiency Thesis?

In Socrates, pleasure, and value. New York: Oxford University Press (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Although Socrates gives a compelling argument in Republic book 1 that virtue is sufficient for happiness, in other passages he seems to hold that it is insufficient. Brickhouse and Smith resolve the apparent inconsistency by attributing an insufficiency thesis to Socrates. I argue, against their interpretation, that Socrates can consistently hold the sufficiency thesis.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,549

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Socrates, Pleasure and Value. [REVIEW]Hugo Meynell - 2002 - Review of Metaphysics 55 (3):647-648.
Socrates, pleasure, and value.George Rudebusch - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Forms of Goodness: The Nature and Value of Virtue in Socratic Ethics.Scott J. Senn - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Socrates, Pleasure and Value. [REVIEW]Donald J. Zeyl - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):490-492.
Happiness for humans.Daniel C. Russell - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Socrates and Superiority.Nathan Hanna - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):251-268.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-25

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

George Hilding Rudebusch
Northern Arizona University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references