Abstract

This small anthology contains thirteen essays by eleven authors on the question: What are the defining characteristics of morality? What makes a judgment, an attitude, or an argument a moral one? The selection of articles is excellent. Ethicians included are: C. H. Whitely, A. MacIntyre, W. K. Frankena, C. C. W. Taylor, Neil Cooper, P. F. Strawson, T. L. S. Sprigge, P. Foot, K. Baier, G. E. M. Anscombe, D. F. Gauthier. An obvious objection to the pursuit of a definition would be to suggest, as Whitely does, that there are no defining traits for all uses of "moral" or "morality": one can hope only to find family resemblances in the uses of the words. Others insist that there is a more precise and consistent use of these notions in ordinary language, though there may be different senses of the word moral, each with sufficiently clear defining traits. In a useful introduction that provides a unifying background for the essays, the editors suggest that six chief candidates appear for the role of the leading characteristic of morality: moral rules and principles can be defined by reference to their capacity for universality, their prescriptivity, their overriding force, the importance they have, the forms of sanctions appealed to, or by reference to their content. The authors in their essays do not, of course, define morality simply in terms of any one of these features; but they do stress or deny the importance of each of these features. Students will find this a helpful work, and there is a good bibliography.--R. D. L.