Decomposing intuitive components in a conceptual problem solving task☆

Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):294-309 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Research into intuitive problem solving has shown that objective closeness of participants’ hypotheses were closer to the accurate solution than their subjective ratings of closeness. After separating conceptually intuitive problem solving from the solutions of rational incremental tasks and of sudden insight tasks, we replicated this finding by using more precise measures in a conceptual problem-solving task. In a second study, we distinguished performance level, processing style, implicit knowledge and subjective feeling of closeness to the solution within the problem-solving task and examined the relationships of these different components with measures of intelligence and personality. Verbal intelligence correlated with performance level in problem solving, but not with processing style and implicit knowledge. Faith in intuition, openness to experience, and conscientiousness correlated with processing style, but not with implicit knowledge. These findings suggest that one needs to decompose processing style and intuitive components in problem solving to make predictions on effects of intelligence and personality measures

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The use of heuristics in intuitive mathematical judgment.Rolf Reber - 2008 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 15:1174-1178.
Conceptual Relativism.Kai Nielsen - 1977 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 3 (1):71-87.
How to Think About Nonconceptual Content.Walter Hopp - 2010 - The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10 (1):1-24.
Problem-Solving, Research Traditions, and the Development of Scientific Fields.Henry Frankel - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:29 - 40.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-24

Downloads
19 (#753,814)

6 months
5 (#544,079)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?