Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):161–171 (2016)

Authors
R. A. Rowland
University of Leeds
Abstract
Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.
Keywords companions in guilt  moral error theory  epistemic reasons  epistemic normativity  normativity
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqv070
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References found in this work BETA

The Indispensability of Mathematics.Mark Colyvan - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
Quantitative Parsimony.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):329-343.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.

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