Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):161–171 (2016)
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| Abstract |
Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.
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| Keywords | companions in guilt moral error theory epistemic reasons epistemic normativity normativity |
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| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqv070 |
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References found in this work BETA
Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
Quantitative Parsimony.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):329-343.
View all 8 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.Christopher Cowie - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):115-130.
On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
Companions in Guilt: Entailment, Analogy, and Absorbtion.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2019 - In Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
Evolutionary Debunking: The Milvian Bridge Destabilized.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2695-2713.
Moral Error Theory, Explanatory Dispensability and the Limits of Guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.
View all 10 citations / Add more citations
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