Moral Disagreement

Abingdon: Routledge (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Widespread moral disagreement raises ethical, epistemological, political, and metaethical questions. Is the best explanation of our widespread moral disagreements that there are no objective moral facts and that moral relativism is correct? Or should we think that just as there is widespread disagreement about whether we have free will but there is still an objective fact about whether we have it, similarly, moral disagreement has no bearing on whether morality is objective? More practically, is it arrogant to stick to our guns in the face of moral disagreement? Must we suspend belief about the morality of controversial actions such as eating meat and having an abortion? And does moral disagreement affect the laws that we should have? For instance, does disagreement about the justice of heavily redistributive taxation affect whether such taxation is legitimate? In this thorough and clearly written introduction to moral disagreement and its philosophical and practical implications, Richard Rowland examines and assesses the following topics and questions: How does moral disagreement affect what we should do and believe in our day-to-day lives? Epistemic peerhood and moral disagreements with our epistemic peers. Metaethics and moral disagreement. Relativism, moral objectivity, moral realism, and non-cognitivism. Moral disagreement and normative ethics. Liberalism, democracy, and disagreement. Moral compromise. Moral uncertainty. Combining clear philosophical analysis with summaries of the latest research and suggestions for further reading, Moral Disagreement is ideal for students of ethics, metaethics, political philosophy, and philosophical topics that are closely related, such as relativism and scepticism. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as public policy and philosophy of law.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Realism and Expert Disagreement.Prabhpal Singh - 2020 - Trames: A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 24 (3):441-457.
Moral Disagreement among Philosophers.Ralph Wedgwood - 2014 - In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press. pp. 23-39.
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
Moral disagreement and moral skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.
What Pessimism about Moral Deference Means for Disagreement.James Fritz - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):121-136.
An Alternative to Relativism.John K. Davis - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
Moral disagreement and moral expertise.Sarah McGrath - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-108.
The moral evil demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Mathematical and Moral Disagreement.Silvia Jonas - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):302-327.
Moral Steadfastness and Meta-ethics.James Fritz & Tristram McPherson - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):43-56.


Added to PP

27 (#564,524)

6 months
15 (#151,521)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Rach Cosker-Rowland
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Moral Relativism and Moral Disagreement.Jussi Suikkanen - forthcoming - In Maria Baghramian, Adam Carter & R. Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Disagreement. Routledge.
Does Deep Moral Disagreement Exist in Real Life?Serhiy Kiš - 2023 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 30 (3):255-277.
Desire, Disagreement, and Corporate Mental States.Olof Leffler - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Companions in Guilt Arguments in the Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.R. A. Rowland - 2019 - In Christopher Cowie & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 187-205.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references