Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):117-124 (2011)
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Abstract

Popper repeatedly emphasised the significance of a critical attitude, and a related critical method, for scientists. Kuhn, however, thought that unquestioning adherence to the theories of the day is proper; at least for ‘normal scientists’. In short, the former thought that dominant theories should be attacked, whereas the latter thought that they should be developed and defended (for the vast majority of the time). -/- Both seem to have missed a trick, however, due to their apparent insistence that each individual scientist should fulfil similar functions (at any given point in time). The trick is to consider science at the group level; and doing so shows how puzzle solving and ‘offensive’ critical activity can simultaneously have a legitimate place in science. This analysis shifts the focus of the debate. The crucial question becomes ‘How should the balance between functions be struck?’.

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Darrell P. Rowbottom
Lingnan University

References found in this work

The Empirical Stance.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2004 - New York: Yale University Press.
The division of cognitive labor.Philip Kitcher - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-22.
Thomas Kuhn.Alexander Bird - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Role of the Priority Rule in Science.Michael Strevens - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):55-79.

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