Against methodological solipsism: The ecological approach

Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):5-24 (1995)
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Abstract

This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J. J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing, paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. Firstly, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Secondly, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made to show how these principles can be extended to cognition as a whole. It is suggested that these principles may have a foundation in evolutionary biology

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Mark Rowlands
University of Miami

Citations of this work

Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive.Mark Rowlands - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1 – 19.
Cognitive Innovation, Cumulative Cultural Evolution, and Enculturation.Regina E. Fabry - 2017 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 17 (5):375-395.
Enactivism, Intentionality, and Content.Mark Rowlands - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):303-316.
What is it like to be nonconscious? A defense of Julian Jaynes.Gary Williams - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):217-239.
Environmental epistemology.Mark Rowlands - 2005 - Ethics and the Environment 10 (2):5-27.

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