Wanting and Intending: Elements of a Philosophy of Practical Mind

Dordrecht: Springer Verlag (2016)
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Abstract

In the book’s first chapter, the topic of practical mind is approached via a brief survey of a number of important positions in the history of philosophy. The founding question for a philosophy of practical mind is raised by Aristotle when he asks what it is in the soul that originates movement. I discuss the answers to this question proposed by Plato, Aristotle himself, Hobbes and Hume, before rounding off the historical survey with a look at the introduction of the notion of “pro-attitude” in the last century. The key question put to the various proposals concerns their capacity to give a unitary account of what it is that “moves” agents. Put in terms of the last of the suggestions discussed: is there a single pro-component that unites the diverse ways of being for something under one genus? And if so, is that pro-component the feature that moves us?

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Chapters

Expressive Explication and the Optative Mode

Chapter 4 develops the idea of an expressive explication of the attitudes, which grounds in the claim that there is an essential structural analogy between mental states and linguistic utterances. The strengths of the conception are first demonstrated by showing how it explains the phenomenon of Moo... see more

The Intention-Consequential Requirements and Anchoring Attributability

The final chapter of the study argues that the disjunctive analysis of intention provides a distinctively plausible explanation of the intention-consequential requirements of practical rationality. Consistent with an analysis that sees intentions as optative attitudes accompanied by only minimal, ne... see more

Motivational States

Chapter 2 develops a first sketch of a systematic answer to Aristotle’s question as to what it is in “the soul” that originates movement. As I take it that this is the founding question not only of a philosophy of practical mind, but also of empirical motivational psychology, I approach the topic wi... see more

The Question of Motivational Unity: Historical Preliminaries

In the book’s first chapter, the topic of practical mind is approached via a brief survey of a number of important positions in the history of philosophy. The founding question for a philosophy of practical mind is raised by Aristotle when he asks what it is in the soul that originates movement. I d... see more

Wanting*, Consciousness and Affect

The last chapter of Part I discusses the relations between optative attitudinising, consciousness and affect. The explication of wanting* in terms of its linguistic expression suggests that conscious thoughts of the appropriate form are sufficient for their bearer to be the bearer of the correspondi... see more

Intention, Belief and the Irreducibility Thesis

The natural first step on the road to an adequate systematic understanding of intending, taken in Chap. 6, is a discussion of intention’s relation to belief. This is natural for two reasons. First, the linguistic means of intention expression have a grammatically assertoric form and second, belief m... see more

Deciding

The last three chapters of the book contain my systematic proposal as to how intentions can be reductively understood whilst accounting for the specificity of the intentional syndrome, in particular whilst allowing us to understand the force of the requirements of intention rationality. The proposal... see more

Intentions, Decisional and Nondecisional

Chapter 9 takes us from the analysis of decision to an analysis of intention. I begin by arguing for conditions which ensure that the products of certain decisions persist as decisional intentions. I then turn to nondecisional intentions, distinguishing five distinct kinds. Nondecisional intentions,... see more

The Intentional Syndrome: Characteristic Causal Features and Rational Requirements

The seventh chapter details intention’s prominent non-doxastic accompaniments, dividing them into two groups: causal consequences of, and normative requirements applicable to intending. The causal features – motivational strength, pervasion of an agent’s mental life and persistence – may frequently ... see more

Wanting* and Its Symptoms

The three-factor conception of motivational states opens the way for a move that severs any necessary connection that may be thought to exist between the “modal” and representational features of motivational states, on the one hand, and the physiological mechanisms brought together under the functio... see more

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Neil Roughley
University of Duisburg-Essen

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