European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):417-451 (2016)

Authors
B. Scot Rousse
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being-with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, sociality is a mere aggregation of individual subjects and the core features of human agency are built into each individual mind. The weak conception of sociality remains today widely taken for granted. I show that Christine Korsgaard, one of the most creative contemporary appropriators of Kant, operates with a weak conception of sociality and that this produces a problematic explanatory deficiency in her view: she is unable to explain the peculiar motivational efficacy of shared social norms. Heidegger's view is tailor made to explain this phenomenon. I end by sketching how Heidegger provides a social explanation of a major systematic concern animating Korsgaard, the concern with the importance of individual autonomy and answerability in human life.
Keywords Heidegger  Sociality  Korsgaard  Motivation
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DOI 10.1111/ejop.12067
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References found in this work BETA

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Self‐Awareness and Self‐Understanding.B. Scot Rousse - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):162-186.
Care, Death, and Time in Heidegger and Frankfurt.B. Scot Rousse - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge. pp. 225-241.
Disordered Existentiality: Mental Illness and Heidegger’s Philosophy of Dasein.Schmid Jelscha - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):485-502.
Agency in Social Context.John Lawless - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):471-498.
Rival Versions of Objective Spirit.Mark Alznauer - 2016 - Hegel Bulletin 37 (2):209-231.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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