Philosophical Foundations of Neurolaw

Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books (2017)
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Abstract

The central philosophical issue confronting neurolaw is whether we can reconcile the conception of ourselves as free, responsible agents with the conception of ourselves as complex physical machines. This book develops and defends an account of free and responsible agency that shows how such reconciliation is possible.

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Martin Roth
Drake University

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