Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity

Noûs 48 (4):626-652 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Shared activity is often simply willed into existence by individuals. This poses a problem. Philosophical reflection suggests that shared activity involves a distinctive, interlocking structure of intentions. But it is not obvious how one can form the intention necessary for shared activity without settling what fellow participants will do and thereby compromising their agency and autonomy. One response to this problem suggests that an individual can have the requisite intention if she makes the appropriate predictions about fellow participants. I argue that implementing this predictive strategy risks derailing practical reasoning and preventing one from forming the intention. My alternative proposal for reconciling shared activity with autonomy appeals to the idea of acting directly on another's intention. In particular, I appeal to the entitlement one sometimes has to another's practical judgment, and the corresponding authority the other sometimes has to settle what one is to do



External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Practical Intersubjectivity.Abraham Roth - 2003 - In F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics : The Nature of Social Reality. Rowman & Littlefield, 65-91. pp. 65-91.
On the Duties of Shared Parenting.Philip Cook - 2012 - Ethics and Social Welfare 6 (2):168-181.
Shared agency and contralateral commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
Shared Agency.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Shared intention and personal intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
Shared agency.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press. pp. 41--59.
Collective and joint intention.Raimo Tuomela - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (2):39-69.
The Moral Authority of International Law.Anthony Reeves - 2010 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law 10 (1):13-18.
We-intentions revisited.Raimo Tuomela - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.


Added to PP

376 (#46,861)

6 months
85 (#43,518)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Abe (Abraham) Roth
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment.Alisabeth Ayars - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):42-61.
Normativity in joint action.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Matthew Rachar - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (1):97-120.
Quasi-Psychologism about Collective Intention.Matthew Rachar - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):475-488.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.

View all 58 references / Add more references