Four Floors for the Theory of Theory Change: The Case of Imperfect Discrimination

In Eduardo Fermé João Leite (ed.), Logics in Artificial Intelligence: 13th European Conference (JELIA 2014). Springer. pp. 368–382 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The classical qualitative theory of belief change due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson has been widely known as being characterised by two packages of postulates. While the basic package consists of six postulates and is very weak, the full package that adds two further postulates is very strong. I revisit two classic constructions of theory contraction, viz., relational possible worlds contraction and entrenchment-based contraction and argue that four intermediate levels can be distinguished that play - or ought to play - important roles within qualitative belief revision theory. Levels 3 and 4 encode two ways of interpreting the idea of imperfect discrimination of the plausibilities of possible worlds or propositions.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Three Floors for the Theory of Theory Change.Hans Rott - 2014 - In Punčochář Vít & Dančák Michal (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2013. College Publications. pp. 187–205.
Basic Entrenchment.Hans Rott - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):257-280.
Foundational belief change.Abhaya C. Nayak - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (5):495 - 533.
A survey of multiple contractions.André Fuhrmann & Sven Ove Hansson - 1994 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (1):39-75.
Resource-bounded belief revision and contraction.Mark Jago - 2006 - In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. pp. 141--154.
Coherentist Contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (3):315 - 330.
Belief Revision, Conditional Logic and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Wayne Wobcke - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (1):55-103.
Infinitary belief revision.Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
On the logic of theory change: Contraction without recovery. [REVIEW]Eduardo L. Fermé - 1998 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):127-137.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-02-27

Downloads
52 (#299,008)

6 months
6 (#522,885)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hans Rott
Universität Regensburg

Citations of this work

Blockage Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2016 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 25 (1):37-50.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references