The identity theory

In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell (1994)

Abstract

In Descartes's time the issue between materialists and their opponents was framed in terms of substances. Materialists such as Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Gassendi maintained that people are physical systems with abilities that no other physical systems have; people, therefore, are special kinds of physical substance. Descartes's DUALISM, by contrast, claimed that people consist of two distinct substances that interact causally: a physical body and a nonphysical, unextended substance. The traditional

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David Rosenthal
CUNY Graduate Center

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