The identity theory
In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell (1994)
AbstractIn Descartes's time the issue between materialists and their opponents was framed in terms of substances. Materialists such as Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Gassendi maintained that people are physical systems with abilities that no other physical systems have; people, therefore, are special kinds of physical substance. Descartes's DUALISM, by contrast, claimed that people consist of two distinct substances that interact causally: a physical body and a nonphysical, unextended substance. The traditional
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
No references found.
Citations of this work
Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness.Amy Kind - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):902-913.
The Inner Game of Sport: Is Everything in the Brain?Jens E. Birch - 2010 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 4 (3):284-305.
On Pain Experience, Multidisciplinary Integration and the Level-Laden Conception of Science.Tudor Baetu - 2017 - Synthese:1-20.
Intentional and Phenomenal Properties: How Not to Be Inseparatists.Miklós Márton - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (1):127-147.
Similar books and articles
Metaphysics of Mind.Thomas W. Polger - 2012 - In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics.
Review of The Evolution of the Soul (2005). [REVIEW]Yujin Nagasawa - 2005 - The Secular Web.
Descartes on Composites, Incomplete Substances, and Kinds of Unity.Dan Kaufman - 2008 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 90 (1):39-73.