Abstract
According to Wlodek Rabinowicz's (2008) fitting-attitude analysis
of value relations, two items are on a par if and only if it is both permissible
to strictly prefer one to the other and permissible to have the opposite strict
preference. Rabinowicz’s account is subject, however, to one important
objection: if strict preferences involve betterness judgements, then his
analysis contrasts with the intuitive understanding of parity. In this paper,
I examine Rabinowicz’s three responses to this objection and argue that
they do not succeed. I then propose an alternative solution. I argue that the
objection can be avoided if we ‘relativize’ Rabinowicz’s account and define
parity in terms of opposite strict preferences between two items that are
only relatively permissible, rather than permissible simpliciter. I argue that
this account of parity can be defended if we take seriously the distinction
between sufficient and decisive reason for a preference relation. I also show
that, on the basis of this distinction, we can arrive at a more extensive
taxonomy of value relations than the one proposed by Rabinowicz.