Abstract

This thesis is a collection of five self-standing articles dealing with different issues relating to representationalism and relationalism in contemporary philosophy of perception and contemporary philosophy of memory. The main goal is to motivate a hybrid approach, where insights from representationalism and relationalism are reconciled, to current debates in both domains. The thesis is divided in two parts. Part I, which deals with perception, starts by seeking alternative relational views of perception by relying on ideas from classical pragmatism. These attempts further result in the development of a hybrid theory of perception, grounded on the pragmatist theory of perception offered by Charles Peirce, that is more sympathetic to “austere” versions of relationalism. Part II, which deals with memory, starts by exploring the prospects of representationalism and relationalism to account for the objects of memory and the objects of episodic hypothetical thought. Relational accounts are further explored in this context for, despite their historical importance, they have been unpopular recently due to the difficulty they face in dealing with memory errors. Finally, as a positive proposal, I offer a hybrid theory of memory that is influenced by hybrid theories of perception. Besides calling the attention of philosophers of memory to the importance of taking relationalism seriously, this hybrid theory provides a novel theoretical framework for contemporary philosophers of memory.