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Moore's paradox and consciousness
Philosophical Perspectives 9:313-33 (1995)
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Citations of this work
An expressivist interpretation of Kant's “I think”.Wolfgang Freitag & Katharina Kraus - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):2020: 1-23.
An expressivist interpretation of Kant's “I think” 1.Wolfgang Freitag & Katharina Kraus - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):110-132.
Moore’s Paradox, Truth and Accuracy: A Reply to Lawlor and Perry.John N. Williams & Mitchell S. Green - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.
Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):99-121.
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