Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):153-165 (2016)

Benjamin Rossi
Duke University
Many moral theorists argue that the concept of moral wrongness is connected to, and can be understood in terms of, the concept of blameworthiness. This tradition has its earliest roots in Mill’s Utilitarianism, and can be found in the work of, among others, Alan Gibbard, Stephen Darwall, and John Skorupski. Their ambition is to offer a non-circular analysis of the concept of moral wrongness in terms of blameworthiness. While these views have been criticized on various grounds, it has not generally been thought that they encounter difficulties accounting for moral excuses. Indeed, it is often that by including a disjunction in the analysans—for example, S’s A-ing is morally wrong if and only if S is either excused or blameworthy for A-ing—these analyses can adequately account for moral excuses. But in attempting to account for moral excuses, these views wind up being either false or circular.
Keywords Moral Responsibility  Blame  Moral Excuses  Moral Wrongness  Alan Gibbard  John Skorupski  Stephen Darwall
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ISBN(s) 0897-2346
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview201632116
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