Synthese 199 (3-4):6429-6454 (2021)

Authors
Marcus Rossberg
University of Connecticut
Stewart Shapiro
Ohio State University
Abstract
According to Ole Hjortland, Timothy Williamson, Graham Priest, and others, anti-exceptionalism about logic is the view that logic “isn’t special”, but is continuous with the sciences. Logic is revisable, and its truths are neither analytic nor a priori. And logical theories are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories are. What isn’t special, we argue, is anti-exceptionalism about logic. Anti-exceptionalists disagree with one another regarding what logic and, indeed, anti-exceptionalism are, and they are at odds with naturalist philosophers of logic, who may have seemed like natural allies. Moreover, those internal battles concern well-trodden philosophical issues, and there is no hint as to how they are to be resolved on broadly scientific grounds. We close by looking at three of the founders of logic who may have seemed like obvious enemies of anti-exceptionalism—Aristotle, Frege, and Carnap—and conclude that none of their positions is clearly at odds with at least some of the main themes of anti-exceptionalism. We submit that, at least at present, anti-exceptionalism is too vague or underspecified to characterize a coherent conception of logic, one that stands opposed to more traditional approaches.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-021-03076-w
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Logic as a Methodological Discipline.Gil Sagi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9725-9749.
Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic and the Burden of Explanation.Ben Martin - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):602-618.

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