Kantian Review 19 (1):127-133 (2014)

Tobias Rosefeldt
Humboldt-University, Berlin
I argue that Patricia Kitcher's Kant-inspired account of self-consciousness overintellectualizes the requirements for rational cognition. Kitcher claims that a person can only believe something on the ground of another belief if she is able to recognize the grounding belief as grounding the first belief and as one of her own. I criticize this claim by arguing that (i) someone can believe something for a certain reason without recognizing this reason as a reason (the possibility of unreflected reasons), and that (ii) she can recognize something as a reason for something else without being able to self-ascribe either her original belief or the belief that grounds it (the possibility of reflected but not self-conscious reasons)
Keywords Kant   rationality   self-consciousness
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s1369415413000344
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,214
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge of Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2011 - In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press. pp. 170--197.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Kant's Thinker.Patricia Kitcher - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Kant on Self-Identity.Patricia Kitcher - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (1):41-72.
«Kant's Thinker». An Exposition.Patricia Kitcher - 2013 - Rivista di Filosofia 104 (1):24-50.
Précis of Kant's Thinker.Patricia Kitcher - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):200-212.
On Interpreting Kant’s Thinker as Wittgenstein’s ‘I’.Patricia Kitcher - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):33-63.
Kant on Self-Consciousness.Patricia Kitcher - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):345-386.


Added to PP index

Total views
65 ( #176,264 of 2,507,555 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #277,263 of 2,507,555 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes