Theory change and bayesian statistical inference

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem that Bayesian statistical inference cannot accommodate theory change, and proposes a framework for dealing with such changes. It first presents a scheme for generating predictions from observations by means of hypotheses. An example shows how the hypotheses represent the theoretical structure underlying the scheme. This is followed by an example of a change of hypotheses. The paper then presents a general framework for hypotheses change, and proposes the minimization of the distance between hypotheses as a rationality criterion. Finally the paper discusses the import of this for Bayesian statistical inference.

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2009-01-28

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Citations of this work

Theory Change and Bayesian Statistical Inference.Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1174-1186.

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References found in this work

Bayesianism and language change.Jon Williamson - 2003 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (1):53-97.
Bayesianism and the Fixity of the Theoretical Framework.Donald Gillies - 2001 - In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 363--379.

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