Abstract

The questions addressed in research on mental imagery have become more refined as experimental techniques have become more exact. One issue that has emerged in current work is whether, or in what ways, imaging is like perceiving. Daniel Reisberg and Deborah Chambers have devised a series of experiments that put that question to the test by asking whether images can be reinterpreted in the same ways that perceptual objects can be reinterpreted. They argue that the evidence points to a negative conclusion. Other psychologists have responded, and a debate has ensued. The debate, intersects with philosophy in two ways: (i) philosophers have appropriated the empirical results in defence of their views on imagery; and (ii) psychologists on both sides have argued about the role of 'philosophical considerations' in evaluating the results. My aim is to clarify the issues at stake, to dispel certain confusions apparent in the literature, and to show that recent research does not support the claim that imaging is unlike perceiving in specific respects