Abstract

This work constitutes a critical study of one particular tradition in contemporary epistemological pragmatism, which stems from the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, and which includes the work of W. V. O. Quine and, most recently, Donald Davidson. The tradition of pragmatism examined here is primarily concerned with meaning, justification and the nature of belief, and, in this respect, contrasts with a second tradition, not discussed here, which views pragmatism as a theory about truth. ;The first chapter begins with an organized reconstruction of Peirce's epistemology, followed by a critical estimation of its virtues and failings. It is argued that the principal virtues of Peirce's epistemology lie, first, in his emphasis on the practical and social character of belief; secondly, in his introduction of a critical argument against foundationalism , which has since become commonplace, and, finally, in his emphasis on the examination of the logic of scientific inquiry. But Peirce does not succeed in his attempt to develop a pragmatist epistemology which adequately deals with the problem of skepticism. ;Quine, who is the main concern of the second chapter, attempts to deal with skepticism by grafting Peircean pragmatism onto a holistic form of empiricism that, it is hoped, does not fall prey to the pragmatist criticisms. The project fails, or so it is argued. But Quine does introduce an important methodological tool for investigating the nature of belief, namely, the examination of the consequences of "radical translation" . ;Davidson, to whom the third chapter is devoted, rejects Quine's empiricism, but retains the interest in radical interpretation. He also accepts Peirce's non-foundationalism as well as Peirce's emphasis on the social and practical nature of belief. Davidson attempts to show that it is a consequence of radical interpretation that global skepticism must be rejected. It is argued that this attempt at rejecting skepticism also does not work. The general conclusion of the dissertation is that the Peircean tradition of pragmatism has failed in its attempt to provide an answer to skepticism