Mind 113 (452):705-725 (2004)

Guy Rohrbaugh
Auburn University
Louis deRosset
University of Vermont
Saul Kripke has claimed that there are necessary connections between material things and their material origins. The usual defences of such necessity of origin theses appeal to either a sufficiency of origin principle or a branching-times model of necessity. In this paper we offer a different defence. Our argument proceeds from more modest ‘independence principles’, which govern the processes by which material objects are produced. Independence principles are motivated, in turn, by appeal to a plausible metaphysical principle governing such processes, their invulnerability to non-local prevention. We outline the new argument, and distinguish it from both of the usual defences.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/113.452.705
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
On the Necessity of Origin.Colin McGinn - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (5):127-135.

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Essential Vs. Accidental Properties.Teresa Robertson & Philip Atkins - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is the Grounding Problem?Louis deRosset - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):173-197.

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