The Divine Controller Argument for Incompatibilism

Faith and Philosophy 29 (3):275-294 (2012)
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Abstract

Incompatibilists hold that, in order for you to be responsible, your choices must come from yourself; thus, determinism is incompatible with responsibility. One way of defending this claim is the Controller Argument: You are not responsible if your choices are caused by a controller, and natural determinism is relevantly similar to such control, therefore... Q.E.D. Compatibilists dispute both of these premises, insisting upon a relevant dissimilarity, or allowing, in a tollens move, that since we can be determined and responsible, we can be controlled and responsible. Positing a divine controller strengthens the argument against these two responses.

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Katherin Rogers
University of Delaware

Citations of this work

Determinism and Divine Blame.John Ross Churchill - 2017 - Faith and Philosophy 34 (4):425-448.
Natural Compatibilists Should Be Theological Compatibilists.Taylor Cyr - forthcoming - In Peter Furlong & Leigh Vicens (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 119-132.
Intuition, Orthodoxy, and Moral Responsibility.John Ross Churchill - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):179-199.

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References found in this work

Responsibility, Luck, and Chance.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-240.
Free action and free will.Gary Watson - 1987 - Mind 96 (April):154-72.
Global control and freedom.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.
Freedom and mind control.David C. Blumenfeld - 1988 - American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (3):215-27.

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