Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):155 - 179 (2007)

Abstract
Curry's paradox, sometimes described as a general version of the better known Russell's paradox, has intrigued logicians for some time. This paper examines the paradox in a natural deduction setting and critically examines some proposed restrictions to the logic by Fitch and Prawitz. We then offer a tentative counterexample to a conjecture by Tennant proposing a criterion for what is to count as a genuine paradox.
Keywords Curry's paradox  normalization  natural deduction
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-006-9032-0
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References found in this work BETA

Natural Deduction: A Proof-Theoretical Study.Dag Prawitz - 1965 - Stockholm, Sweden: Dover Publications.
Beginning Logic.E. J. Lemmon - 1965 - London, England: Thomas Nelson and Sons.
Symbolic Logic: An Introduction.Frederic Brenton Fitch - 1952 - New York: Ronald Press Co..
How to Be R Eally Contraction-Free.Greg Restall - 1993 - Studia Logica 52 (3):381 - 391.

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Citations of this work BETA

What is a Relevant Connective?Shawn Standefer - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (4):919-950.
Ekman’s Paradox.Peter Schroeder-Heister & Luca Tranchini - 2017 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 58 (4):567-581.
Contraction and Revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.
Not Every Truth has a Truthmaker II.Peter Milne - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):473-481.

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