Abstract

Interest-relative invariantism conjoins the interest-relativist thesis that knowledge depends in part on our interests with the invariantist thesis that ‘knows’ is not a context-sensitive word. Neither thesis entails the other, and interest-relativism is interesting in its own right. If interest-relativism is true, then knowledge depends in part on truth-irrelevant factors, since our interests will often be irrelevant to our grip on the truth. In Chapter 1, I steer the debate away from the invariantist thesis that ‘knows’ is not a context-sensitive word and toward the interest-relativist thesis that knowledge depends in part on our interests. Interest-relativism comes in two varieties: what I call ‘pragmatism’ and ‘intellectualism.’ Pragmatism is the view that practical interests can make a difference to knowledge, while intellectualism is the view that intellectual interests can make a difference to knowledge. Pragmatism and intellectualism might both be true, but neither view entails the other. While pragmatism has received considerable attention in the literature, intellectualism has scarcely been identified as a position in logical space, and it has no defenders. As a result, many philosophers think they can resist interest-relativism by simply resisting pragmatism. In Chapters 2 through 7, I show otherwise. First, in Chapters 2 through 6, I argue extensively against pragmatism. Then, in Chapter 7, I argue for intellectualism. Since purism is just the denial of pragmatism, and since intellectualism is a species of interest-relativism, Chapters 2 through 7 jointly defend purist interest-relativism. Knowledge depends in part on our interests, but not on our practical interests, I argue. Along the way, I sketch a theory of belief, apply this theory of belief to questions about the value of knowledge, and say how believing that p relates to one’s credence that p.