Truthmaker Maximalism defended again

Analysis 75 (1):3-8 (2015)
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Abstract

In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Gödel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and not semantic. In Section 2, we shall argue that Milne is still begging the question against Truthmaker Maximalism. In Section 3, we shall argue that even assimilating M to the Liar does not force the truthmaker maximalist to maintain the ‘dull option’ that M does not express a proposition. There are other options open and, though they imply revising the logic in Milne’s reasoning, this is not one of the possible revisions he considers. In Section 4, we shall suggest that Milne’s proof requires an implicit appeal to semantic principles and notions. In Section 5, we shall point out that there are two important dissimilarities between M and the Gödel sentence. Section 6 is a brief summary and conclusion

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Author Profiles

Eduardo Alejandro Barrio
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)

References found in this work

Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Two Flavors of Curry’s Paradox.Jc Beall & Julien Murzi - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
Truth without contra(di)ction.Elia Zardini - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.
Reflecting on incompleteness.Solomon Feferman - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.

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