In A. Eden, J. H. Søraker, E. Steinhart & A. H. Moore (eds.), The Singularity Hypothesis: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment. Springer (2012)

Authors
David Roden
Open University (UK)
Abstract
In his 1993 article ‘The Coming Technological Singularity: How to survive in the posthuman era’ the computer scientist Virnor Vinge speculated that developments in artificial intelligence might reach a point where improvements in machine intelligence result in smart AI’s producing ever-smarter AI’s. According to Vinge the ‘singularity’, as he called this threshold of recursive self-improvement, would be a ‘transcendental event’ transforming life on Earth in ways that unaugmented humans are not equipped to envisage. In this paper I argue Vinge’s idea of a technologically led intelligence explosion is philosophically important because it requires us to consider the prospect of a posthuman condition succeeding the human one. What is the ‘humanity’ to which the posthuman is ‘post’? Does the possibility of a posthumanity presuppose that there is a ‘human essence’, or is there some other way of conceiving the human-posthuman difference? I argue that the difference should be conceived as a historically emergent disconnection between individuals, not in terms of the presence or lack of essential properties. I also suggest that these individuals should not be conceived in narrow biological terms but in ‘wide’ terms permitting biological, cultural and technological relations of descent between human and posthuman. Finally, I consider the ethical implications of this metaphysics of the posthuman. If, as I claim, the posthuman difference is not one between kinds but between individuals, we cannot specify its nature a priori but only a posteriori. Thus the only way to evaluate the posthuman condition would be to witness the emergence of posthumans. The implications of this are somewhat paradoxical. We are not currently in a position to evaluate the posthuman condition. Since there are no posthumans, the condition of posthumanity is not defined. However, posthumans could result from some iteration of our current technical activity, so we have an interest in understanding what they might be like. It follows that we have an interest in making or becoming posthumans
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References found in this work BETA

Computing Machinery and Intelligence.Alan M. Turing - 1950 - Mind 59 (October):433-60.
Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.John Rawls - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (9):515-572.

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Citations of this work BETA

On Reason and Spectral Machines: Robert Brandom and Bounded Posthumanism.David Roden - 2017 - In Rosi Braidotti Rick Dolphijn (ed.), Philosophy After Nature. London - New York: Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 99-119.
Sexuality in a Context of Speculative Posthumanism: Human-Posthuman Ruptures and Disconnections.Nataliia V. Zahurska - 2019 - Вісник Харківського Національного Університету Імені В. Н. Каразіна. Серія «Філософія. Філософські Перипетії» 60:6-12.

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