Searle Freed of every flaw

Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):161-175 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Strong Al presupposes (1) that Super-Searle (henceforth ‘Searle’) comes to know that the symbols he manipulates are meaningful , and (2) that there cannot be two or more semantical interpretations for the system of symbols that Searle manipulates such that the set of rules constitutes a language comprehension program for each interpretation. In this paper, I show that Strong Al is false and that presupposition #1 is false, on the assumption that presupposition #2 is true. The main argument of the paper constructs a second program, isomorphic to Searle’s, to show that if someone, say Dan, runs this isomorphic program, he cannot possibly come to know what its mentioned symbols mean because they do not mean anything to anybody. Since Dan and Searle do exactly the same thing, except that the symbols they manipulate are different, neither Dan nor Searle can possibly know whether the symbols they manipulate are meaningful (let alone what they mean, if they are meaningful). The remainder of the paper responds to an anticipated Strong Al rejoinder, which, I believe, is a necessary extension of Strong Al

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The chinese room argument: Consciousness and understanding.Simone Gozzano - 1997 - In Matjaz Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press. pp. 43--231.
Searle's chinese room argument.Larry Hauser - unknown - Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
A Modal Defence of Strong AI.Steffen Borge - 2007 - In Dermot Moran Stephen Voss (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy. The Philosophical Society of Turkey. pp. 127-131.
Can semantics be syntactic?Neal Jahren - 1990 - Synthese 82 (3):309-28.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
88 (#177,203)

6 months
2 (#668,348)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Victor Rodych
University of Lethbridge

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Reflections.Douglas R. Hofstadter & Daniel C. Dennett - 1981 - In D. R. Hofstadter & D. C. Dennett (eds.), The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul. New York: Basic Books.
What intuitions about homunculi don't show.Ned Block - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):425-426.

Add more references