Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection

Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):129-143 (2004)
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Abstract

Does the ability to know one's own mind depend on the ability to know the minds of others? According to the 'theory theory' of first-person mentalizing, the answer is yes. Recent alternative accounts of this ability, such as the 'monitoring theory', suggest otherwise. Focusing on the issue of introspective access to propositional attitudes, I argue that a better account of first-person mentalizing can be devised by combining these two theories. After sketching a hybrid account, I show how it can do justice to competing intuitions about the nature of introspective self-awareness. I close by drawing some methodological morals about the study of mentalizing and the role of introspective evidence in cognitive science.

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Philip Robbins
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

On the possibility and reality of introspection.Michel Bitbol & Claire Petitmengin - 2013 - Kairos. Revista de Filosofia and Ciência 6:173-198.
The ins and outs of introspection.Philip Robbins - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (6):617–630.
Introspection, mindreading, and the transparency of belief.Uwe Peters - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1086-1102.

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