Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):487-500 (2015)

Tom Roberts
University of Exeter
I argue that one’s responsibility for one’s emotions has a two-fold structure: one bears direct responsibility for emotions insofar as they are the upshot of first-order evaluative judgements concerning reasons of fit; and one bears derivative responsibility for them insofar as they are consequences of activities of emotional self-regulation, which can reflect one’s take on second-order reasons concerning the strategic, prudential, or moral desirability of undergoing a particular emotion in a particular context
Keywords Emotion  Responsibility  Regulation  Reasons
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-014-9535-7
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

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Citations of this work BETA

Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
The Creeps as a Moral Emotion.Jeremy Fischer & Rachel Fredericks - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:191-217.

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